The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB)
       NEW UPDATE 2023
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About The Global Sanctions Database (GSDB)

The GSDB-R3  extends the period of coverage from 1950-2019 to 1950-2022, which includes two special periods -- COVID-19 and the war between Russia and Ukraine. The new update of the GSDB contains a total of 1,325 cases. In response to multiple inquiries and requests, the GSDB-R3 has been amended with a new variable that distinguishes between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. Additionally, the GSDB classifies these sanctions on the basis of three important dimensions. First, by the type(s) of sanctions considered (e.g., trade sanctions vs. financial sanctions vs. travel sanctions, etc.). Second, by the political objective(s) behind the observed sanction(s). In particular, the GSDB  systematically groups sanction objectives into distinct categories (e.g., policy change, destabilization of a regime, war prevention, human rights, etc.) of recorded policy objectives. Third, by the perceived degree of success for each identified sanction, captured by five distinct categories ranging from failed sanctions to the target's full acceptance of the sender's demands.

A distinct trait of the GSDB is that it is well-suited to address issues related to bilateral and multilateral linkages in trade relations and the intricate structure of applied sanctions. The GSDB should not be viewed as being designed exclusively for the analysis of issues related to international trade. On the contrary, the GSDB's information on sanctions can be utilized to study their effects in a broad range of areas/fields, including their implications for financial flows, tourism, the determinants of war, and the significance of democratization efforts. What's more, the detailed identification of different types of sanctions in the GSDB may help deepen researchers' understanding of the interplay between different sanctions policies, thereby enabling them to determine which combinations of sanction types are more effective in achieving various policy objectives.

The GSDB's information on sanctions can be utilized to study their effects in a broad range of areas/fields, including their implications for financial flows, tourism, the determinants of war, and the significance of democratization efforts. What's more, the detailed identification of different types of sanctions in the GSDB may help deepen researchers' understanding of the interplay between different sanctions policies, thereby enabling them to determine which combinations of sanction types are more effective in achieving various policy objectives. We hasten to add that the dyadic structure of the dataset can help extract more nuanced information on the nature of interactions, not just among senders and targets, but also among non-sanctioning countries.

The first dimension of the GSDB allows to take a close look at the distribution of applied sanctions by type (e.g., trade versus financial sanctions, mobility etc.), extent of the intervention (e.g., partial versus complete sanctions), and region (e.g., whether sanctions are imposed unilaterally or reciprocally by countries). In addition, the GSDB helps obtain a clear view of the evolution of sanctions over time and relative to each country. We view these features of the GSDB, especially the bilateral structure of recorded sanctions, as salient and indispensable. We think their application can help bridge the current gap in scholarship between the sophisticated developments in empirical trade tools and their application to policy assessments related to the possible costs and benefits of sanctions.

The second dimension of the GSDB, policy objectives of sanctions, is defined on the basis of official declarations, including UN resolutions and/or executive orders. Policy objectives are categorized and can be compared across all years and cases. The database allows a comprehensive analysis e.g. how policy objectives of sanctions have changed over time.

The third dimension of the GSDB documents and assesses the policy outcomes of classified sanctions policy objectives. The achievement of a policy objective is evaluated on the basis of information contained in official government statements or indirect confirmations in international press announcements. Notably, the GSDB permits analysis to track the success rate of sanctions policies over the years under consideration.
TEAM
Gabriel
Felbermayr
Professor of International Economics and Director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research
Aleksandra
Kirilakha
School of Economics of the LeBow College of Business at Drexel University (Philadelphia, USA).
Constantinos
Syropoulos
Professor at the School of Economics of the LeBow College of Business at Drexel University (Philadelphia, USA).
Erdal
Yalcin
Professor of International Economics at the University of Applied Sciences Konstanz (HTWG) in Germany.
Yoto V.
Yotov
Professor at the School of Economics of the LeBow College of Business at Drexel University (Philadelphia, USA) and a Research Professor at the Center for International Economics of the ifo Institute, at the University of Munich.
The Global Sanctions Database is a joint project of the following three institutions:
Research

Research Based On The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB)

The GSDB has been utilized in the following research projects and papers:

The global sanctions data base-Release 3: COVID-19, Russia, and multilateral sanctions
(C. Syropoulos, G. Felbermayr, Kirilakha, A., E. Yalcin, and Y.V. Yotov)
Published in the Review of International Economics, 2023.

Corresponding paper can be accessed here: https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12691

Abstract:
The global sanctions data base (GSDB) is a public good that was created in response to demand by scholars and institutions. The initial development of the database and its subsequent updates required substantial long-term efforts by the authors. Accordingly, in return for that effort, we expect two things from all users of the GSDB.
First, please cite the current paper along with the following two papers, if you use Release 3 of the database: Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, “The Global Sanctions Data Base,” European Economic Review, 2020, 129 (C).Kirilakha, Aleksandra, Gabriel Felbermayr, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, “The Global Sanctions Data Base: An Update that Includes the Years of the Trump Presidency.” In the Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021.Second, if you believe that you have discovered an error in the database or that the database can be improved by incorporating additional or more reliable data, even if only for an individual sanction case or any of its dimensions, please let us know by writing to the GSDB's e-mail address (GSDB@drexel.edu). We will do our best to accommodate any detection of errors, inconsistencies, and suggestions as soon as possible. For possible updates, please visit http://www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com.


The Global Sanctions Data Base: An Update that Includes the Years of the Trump Presidency
(Kirilakha, A., G. Felbermayr, C. Syropoulos, E. Yalcin and Y.V. Yotov)
Published in The Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions. Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021.

The corresponding working paper can be downloaded here: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2021_010.html

Abstract:
We introduce and discuss 381 previously unrecorded sanction cases among which 75 emerged during 2016-2019, a period that coincides with the Trump presidency. These newly considered cases are included in the updated Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of Felbermayr et al. (2020), thus raising the total of sanction cases recorded there to 1101. Our descriptive analysis reveals that a number of sanctions were lifted in 2016. However, in 2017 we witnessed a substantial increase in the deployment of new -- primarily `smart' (i.e., financial and travel) -- sanctions of which more than half were imposed by the United States. Moreover, we observed a significant rise in the number of sanctions aiming to `change' the policies of sanctioned states and to fight `terrorism'. Almost all sanctions initiated by the Trump administration are still in place, so assessment of their success remains open.



The Global Sanctions Data Base
(Felbermayr, G.,  A. Kirilakha, C. Syropoulos,  E. Yalcin, and Y. V. Yotov)
Published in the European Economic Review, Volume 129, October 2020.

The corresponding working paper can be downloaded here: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2020_002.html

Abstract:
This article introduces the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB), a new dataset of economic sanctions that covers all bilateral, multilateral, and plurilateral sanctions in the world from 1950 to 2016 across three dimensions: type, political objective, and extent of success. The GSDB features by far the most cases amongst data bases that focus on effective sanctions (i.e., excluding threats) and is particularly useful for analysis of bilateral international transactional data (such as trade flows). We highlight five important stylized facts: (i) sanctions are increasingly used over time; (ii) European countries are the most frequent users and African countries the most frequent targets; (iii) sanctions are becoming more diverse, with the share of trade sanctions falling and that of financial or travel sanctions rising; (iv) the main objectives of sanctions are increasingly related to democracy or human rights; (v) the success rate of sanctions has gone up until 1995 and fallen since then. Using state-of-the-art gravity modeling, we highlight the usefulness of the GDSB in the realm of international trade. Trade sanctions have a negative but heterogeneous effect on trade, which is most pronounced for complete bilateral sanctions, followed by complete export sanctions.


Timing the Impact of Sanctions on Trade
(Dai, M., G. Felbermayr,  A. Kirilakha, C. Syropoulos,  E. Yalcin, and Y. V. Yotov)

The corresponding working paper can be downloaded here: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2021_007.html

Abstract:
We capitalize on the latest estimation methods in the empirical gravity literature and the development of a new dataset (the Global Sanctions Data Base, GSDB) to study the evolution, over time, of the effects of sanctions on international trade. Our analysis reveals that the contemporaneous effects of sanctions on trade are large, negative and statistically significant. Additionally, we obtain negative and significant anticipatory effects prior to the official imposition of sanctions, as well as negative and significant post-sanction effects, which disappear gradually approximately eight years after the lifting of sanctions. Our work generates several insights related to the estimation of the impact of sanctions on trade and unveils new avenues for future work. For example, we find the strength of the negative impact of sanctions to rise with the duration of the time that sanctions are in force. Moreover, our analysis of unilateral vs. multilateral and US vs. UN vs. EU sanctions suggests that unilateral sanctions and sanctions imposed by the US stand out as being most effective. A battery of sensitivity experiments confirms the robustness of our main findings and conclusions.


On the Heterogeneous Effects of Sanctions on Trade and Welfare: Evidence from the Sanctions on Iran and a New Database
(Felbermayr, G., C. Syropoulos, Y. V. Yotov, and E. Yalcin)

The corresponding working paper can be downloaded here: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2020_004.html

Abstract:
Using a new, global data base covering the years 1950 to 2016, we study the impact of sanctions on international trade and welfare. We make use of the rich dimensionality of our data and of the latest developments in the structural gravity literature. Starting with a broad evaluation by sanction type, we carefully investigate the case of Iran. Effects are significant but also widely heterogeneous across sanctioning countries. Moreover, they depend on the direction of trade. We also perform a counterfactual analysis which translates our partial equilibrium sanction estimates into heterogeneous but intuitive general equilibrium effects within the same framework.
DATA

The GSDB is a public good that was earnestly created in response to market demand. Its initial development and maintenance took a substantial long-term effort by a number of us. Accordingly, in return for that effort, we expect two things from all users of the GSDB. First, if you use the GSDB please cite the latter papers. Second, if you detect an error in the dataset, please inform us as soon as possible. In order to accommodate the detection of errors and inconsistencies in the early life of the GSDB, our team is committed to updating it regularly during the first two years after its official release on July 1, 2020. After the initial two-year period, the GSDB will be updated annually.

Version 1 published in July 2020.
Version 2 published in March 2021.
Version 3 published in June 2023.

The GSDB is freely available and we will be happy to share it with interested researchers, who can request it

by e-mail at GSDB@drexel.edu.

In order to ensure the consistency of the GSDB data, we only make the GSDB data available from this webpage. Distribution of the GSDB data through other websites or institutions is not permitted. We kindly ask all users not to upload the data independently to another platform.
CONTACT
Please write us an email with your name and affiliation. We are happy to send you the Global Sanctions Database
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